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Introduction
In Azanism: A Critical Analysis of the Mytho-Reality 
Complexity of the Azanian Nation (Guevara, 2009/2011), I 
took considerable pains to reintegrate the subcultures of the 
indigenous population of colonial Africa into the main culture 
school of the Bantu/Cushitic-Ethiopians kingdom (hence-
forth Azania) situated then in Karnak/Thebes. Hence, ethno-
culturally, I discussed the concept of “Pan-ism” in relation to 
precolonial/prepolitical African—that is, the Azanian (or later 
ancient Egyptian) pan-deity Min.1 Moreover, although I dis-
cussed the importance of the “Ritual of Resurrection” (see 
Guevara, 2009/2011, pp. 183-200, esp. pp.189-192) and its 
twin culture process of the “mummification of the indigenous 
Pharaohs” to the objective of the Azanian national culture, I 
stressed that such symbolic culture practices are supplemen-
tary to that nation’s culture commitment to the eternal essence 
of life, Manfou[i]r/Menefre (the Greco-European Memphis).2 
It is in light of such culture commitment and the fact that the 
whole Nile Valley region was an inextricable part of these 
culture processes that I questioned the national essence of the 
pan-African Movement(s)/PAMs and/or the numerous irre-
dentist movements on Africa’s political plain, especially 
given most African leaders subscription to the colonial ideal 
(the African states) through which a United States of Africa or 
Africa’s newly emerging tribal entities (e.g., the Biafras, 
Hutustan, Eritrea, Somali-land, etc.) could be forged.
Put simply, ethnic and culture reasons prompted my cri-
tique of both Pan-Africanism and Africa’s tribal (pseudoeth-
nic) irredentism. For instance, after meticulously scrutinizing 
the process by which Eritrea forged its national identity, and 
on the basis of which it eventually achieved statehood, and 
Somaliland’s apparent route to secession, the scholar 
Dominique Jacquin-Berdal (2002) came to the conclusion 
that in both cases it was the “colonial self” rather than ethnic-
ity that provided the basis for secession, while it was “war” 
that proved to be the catalyst of nation formation. Three key 
events are important in her analysis of the formation of 
Eritrea in particular: The first was the creation of Eritrea as a 
colonial state, an event which not only provided Eritrea with 
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Abstract
This essaic-article goes against established conventions that there is anything ethno-cultural (and hence national) about the 
so-called African tribes. Drawing largely from the culture history of precolonial/prepolitical Africans—that is, the Bantu/
Cushitic-Ethiopians (Azanians)—the author has demonstrated vividly that far from being distinct ethno-culture national 
communities, the so-called tribes of African states are better considered subculture groups, whose regional culture practices 
erstwhile paid tribute to their nation’s main culture center in Karnak. For example, using the culture symbols and practices 
of some local groups and linking them to the predynastic and dynastic Pharaonic periods, I argued that there is compelling 
evidence against qualifying Africa’s tribes as distinct ethno-culture national entities. In genuine culture context, I stressed that 
the Ritual of Resurrection and its twin culture process of the mummification of deceased indigenous Pharaohs tend to suggest 
that the object of the Bantu/Cushitic-Ethiopians national culture was life (in its eternal manifestation) and then resurrection 
later, and that there are recurring (culturally sanctioned) ethical examples among the culture custodians of these subculture 
groups that generally pay tribute to the overarching culture norm. Furthermore, the fact that the Ritual of Resurrection 
began in the Delta region and ended at the Sources of the Nile, where the spirit of the deceased indigenous Pharaohs was 
introduced into the spiritual world of their ancestors, contradicts conventional perceptions that ancient Egypt was a distinct 
national community isolated from precolonial/prepolitical Africa/Azania.
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its name and geographical identity, but with a history distinct 
from that of Ethiopia. The second was the period of 
Federation (1952-1962) during which Eritrea acquired the 
institutions and symbols of autonomy, and finally the libera-
tion war itself, during which the nationalist struggle gradu-
ally spread from a small elite to encompass the Eritrean 
masses. It was also during this period that Eritrea’s identity 
was cemented and given its present characteristic by the 
“dominant Movement,” the Eritrean People’s Liberation 
Front (EPLF). In other words, while Dominique’s position 
seems close to sharing the ethno-symbolist perception that 
one cannot make bricks without straw (Anthony, 1991/1986), 
however, in her analysis of Africa’s state-nations that straw 
was not ethnic. Thus, in her critique of the ethnic interpreta-
tion of the origins and spread of nationalism, her argument is 
simply that in much of Africa, ethnicity as much as national-
ism is a modern creation. She maintains accurately that, the 
colonial administration’s need to “map” the population under 
its control led to the establishment of categories whose con-
tours were in many cases substantially different from those 
that had previously prevailed (Jacquin-Berdal, 2002).
Dominique’s lucid analysis, among others, has proven 
critical to the novel concept of pseudoethnicity and pseudona-
tionalism developed in Azanism with specific reference to 
contemporary African politics. This is particularly true of 
Muamar Gaddafi’s recent (preassassination) approval of the 
partitioning of Nigeria into Christians and Islamist dominated 
states. Subsequently, this essaic-article which is meant to 
strengthen the ethno-culture paradigm of real nations shall 
thus expand on the concept of genuine-/pseudonationalism so 
as to elaborate on that position. Because this article is gener-
ally meant to expose the culture deficit of postcolonial African 
politics, it will thus be reasonable to critically review the 
major inconsistencies characterizing the political mandate of 
some key PAM(s) figures (e.g., the late Kwame Nkrumah, 
Julius Nyerere, and Muammar Gaddafi). This should demon-
strate how PAMs’ political mandate continues to adversely 
affect the indigenous people’s culture quest for genuine free-
dom (see “Questioning the Pan-Africanist Unionist Paradigm” 
section).
Indeed Gaddafi’s approval of pseudoethnic entities/iden-
tities on Africa’s political plain accords with early colonial-
ist attempts to create tribal states in colonial Africa. Such a 
divisive heritage, which doubtlessly has become synony-
mous with contemporary African politics, can rightly be 
contrasted with the urge in Azanism to rediscover the ethno-
culture origin of the Azanian nation. Following this ethno-
culture emphasis in Azanism, I will thus seek to explore the 
ethnic affinities spanning across the subculture groups of 
Nŋhana (ancient Ghana) with the view to reintegrating them 
in the culture fold/school of the Azanian nation (see “Are 
We at the Verge of a Genuine Ethno-Cultural National 
Reawakening?” section).
Questioning the Pan-Africanist Unionist 
Paradigm
A Review of Muammar Gaddafi’s Approval of 
Pseudoethnic Identities in Colonial Africa
Prior to his assassination in August 2011, Muammar Gaddafi 
was generally heralded by advocates of pan-Africanism as a 
great unionist leader—despite obvious facts to the contrary. 
In fact, some even considered him then to be the rightful heir 
to Nkrumah’s pan-Africanism (and hence the champion of 
African Unity [AU]). Such fortuitous approval of Gaddafi 
unionist credentials had—mirabile dictu—been made in bla-
tant disregard to his divisive stance vis-à-vis Nigeria’s polit-
ico-religious crisis, which could easily be replicated across 
the whole of colonial Africa. In any event, the prevailing ido-
lum that the culture values of the indigenous peoples of colo-
nial Africa are inferior to the dominant politico-religious 
cultures imposed on them by agents of colonialism is widely 
approved by local politicians. It should therefore not come as 
surprise that the main beneficiaries of Gaddafi’s financial 
intrigue among the satraps (leaders?) of the African states 
(and leaders of African communities in the diaspora) had in 
the past overlooked the divisive statements of that erratic 
character, who until his demise disguised himself for a 
staunch defender of the AU.
For example, speaking to the mammoth crowd that braved 
the afternoon heat in Nakivubo War Memorial Stadium after 
leading the Thuhur (afternoon) prayers, Muammar Gaddafi 
(on the occasion to open Africa’s largest Mosque in Kampala) 
stated that “any Bible or Tora (Old Testament) that does not 
mention prophet Mohamed was written by mankind and 
therefore a fraud.”3
Despite his Islamic bias, Professor Ali A. Mazrui—on 
the occasion of Kwame Nkrumah’s 100th Anniversary—
postulated Gaddafi as the timely heir to Nkrumah’s legacy 
of pan-Africanism (Mazrui, 2009). Even Gaddafi’s app- 
roval of the partitioning of Nigeria into Christians- and 
Moslems-dominated pseudoethnic state-nations had also 
been largely overlooked by most local commentators. In 
fact, the official condemnation issued by the foreign min-
istry in Nigeria (after Gaddafi’s divisive remarks) amounts 
to such nugatory statement as “Colonel Gaddafi’s irre-
sponsible utterances” or “his theatrics and grandstanding 
at every auspicious occasion have become too numerous to 
recount.” Astonishingly, that was the official response to 
Gaddafi’s overt approval of the partition of India in 1947 
as the kind of historic solution that could benefit Nigeria.4 
If anything, such a divisive statement does not seem to 
have come from someone who in 2009-2010 was the chair-
person the AU.
True, prior to becoming the AU chairperson in 2009, 
Gaddafi was factitiously outspoken about the urgent need for 
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a United States of Africa,5 And had once stated that “I shall 
continue to insist that our sovereign countries work to 
achieve the United States of Africa.”6 He even went as far 
“envisaging a single military force, a single currency, and a 
single passport for the Africans to move freely around the 
continent.”7 Probably attracted by the Bantu-Ethiopian 
Pharaonic title, the then Libyan strongman had earlier a 
group of 200 traditional African chiefs named him the “King 
of kings,” thus signaling his disdain for the prevailing demo-
cratic nostrum being imposed on the African states by 
Western powers. Speaking at the AU summit in Addis Ababa 
in 2009, Gaddafi was aplomb and perhaps atarvistic about 
the shortcomings of democracy in Africa. As he puts it,
Africa was essentially tribal; and multiparty democracy only 
worsens the situation as most political parties draw their core 
support base along tribal lines. Thus, his radical solution for 
Africa’s tribal political allegiances was the Libyan example 
where opposition parties were outlawed.8
His Arabo-Islamic bias became more apparent when he 
insisted on the inclusion of the Islamic code of practice in 
AU decision-making process in which “silence on important 
policy issues is considered a tacit approval.”9
Gaddafi’s Arabo-Islamic bias notwithstanding, his cun-
ning admiration of the indigenous Pharaonic model10 doubt-
lessly earned him then the allegiance and support of some 
traditional chiefs, which, in the event of genuine national 
revival, would have weighed significantly on the conscience 
of the Azanians. This notwithstanding, it should be empha-
sized that not all pan-Africanists were comfortable with 
Gaddafi’s grand political ambitions. For instance, Yao 
Graham, who is critical of the AU’s choice of Gaddafi as the 
Union chairperson in 2009, argued vehemently against con-
fusing Gaddafi’s political opportunism with Nkrumah’s pan-
African dreams. Citing the much quoted phrase of David 
Rooney’s Critical Biography on Kwame Nkrumah, “His 
hopes were encapsulated in his ultimate goal of a united 
Africa in which its rich natural resources would benefit its 
people and not the capitalist system and other exploiters,” he 
cautioned against accrediting Gaddafi with Nkrumah’s grand 
unionist credentials (Yao, 2009).
Indeed, whether or not Gaddafi merits the credit of a gen-
uine unionist leader is ineluctably pivotal in that while he 
would have imposed the Arabic language and the Islamic 
faith on the indigenous people of a United States of Africa; 
and had in the past also used the pelf of Libya to finance the 
destabilization of African states south of the Nubian Desert 
(e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Somalia, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria, and Uganda); and had even implicitly sponsored the 
displacement and misappropriation of indigenous land in 
Mali, Niger and Mauritania, and so on to make more 
“Lebensraum for the ‘Second-Phase’ of Arabs colonial 
expansion” (Chinweizu, 2006); there is no doubt that most 
pan-Africanists would rather shy away from Nkrumah’s 
political shortcomings vis-à-vis his people’s culture quest for 
real freedom and national unity.
I observed in Azanism that Kwame Nkrumah was also 
forthrightly outspoken about his internationalist ambitions 
and, above all, his commitment to scientific socialism. Thus, 
in genuine national context (in which the freedom of a peo-
ple is the inspiration behind nationalist movements), that 
Kwame Nkrumah—in light of his fortuitous conviction to 
the lineal/progressive economic ideal of scientific social-
ism—would have exonerated Karl Marx11 (from his ambiva-
lent approval of British colonial rule in India or the superior 
Germanics colonization of Peasant Slavs in Europe) is bound 
to taint Nkrumah’s national credentials significantly. 
Nkrumah’s generous political (and not cultural) commitment 
to AU until his death in 1972 could be summed up in his link-
ing of Gold Coast or modern Ghana’s independence to that 
of the rest of colonial Africa, as in this statement
die Freiheit und Unhängigkeit Ghanas ist bedeutunglos, wenn 
sie nicht mit den totalen Befreiung Afrikas verknüft wird [The 
Independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up 
with that of the total liberation of the African continent]. 
(Hannah, 1967, p. 203)
However, his ambivalent approval of the atrocities associ-
ated with scientific socialism raises more questions about his 
genuine commitment to the freedom of his people. If any-
thing, it should thus be emphasized that Kwame Nkrumah, 
like Yao Graham who today (like most pan-African cadres) 
lauds his democratic bias, was equally enthusiastic about his 
contemporary “Scientific Socialism.”12
Inevitably, Nkrumah’s myopic political obligation to the 
lineal economic ideal of his contemporary scientific social-
ism made him, like some of his predecessors,13 yet another 
victim of similar political marriages that was to later cement 
the incremental infiltration and destruction of the Bantu/
Cushitic-Ethiopians culture institutions by economically 
inspired political influx mainly from the north and northeast-
ern fringes of the Azanian nation. Lamentably, that such 
political influx then and now has the intent of seizing control 
of the culture centers of the Azanian nation and her vast natu-
ral resources also found mention in Diop’s (1974) African 
Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality.
The Persistence of the Indigenous Culture and Its 
Importance to National Revival
In light of the fact that, prior to being a committed pan- 
Africanist, Nkrumah was first an advocate of West Azania’s 
(Africa’s?) independence and unity via scientific socialism 
(as this is evidenced by his invocation of the concept of 
Nŋhana/ancient Ghana for his supposedly newly indepen-
dent Gold Coast), let’s critically review the culture essence 
of Nŋhana so as to demonstrate why national emancipation 
process that fails to embrace the institutions of indigenous 
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culture(s) is bound to be superficial and tenuous. For 
instance, Diop (1959), who had researched the social history 
of the Bantu-Ethiopians extensively, traces the concept of 
Nŋhana back to the demise of Meroe14—one of the last ref-
uges of the retreating custodians of the Azanian national cul-
ture. Although there is still no academic consensus about the 
origin of Nŋhana per se, most scholars now agree that that 
kingdom was a genuine indigenous communal or social 
endeavor; and that most of the indigenous subculture groups 
of (what is formally) the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) region played a pivotal role in its 
foundation (Hannah, 1967). Importantly, in its over thousand 
years history (which began around the 1st century a.d.), the 
culture and political influence of Nŋhana stretched from the 
Western fringes of present day Sudan covering the whole of 
the ECOWAS region (West Sudan) and parts of Southern and 
Central Algeria and Morocco. Consequently, any political 
attempt to resuscitate the concept of Nŋhana would inelucta-
bly have had wider cultural implications for the region’s 
indigenous communities. In fact, judging from that concept 
of culture significance and/or its indispensability in terms of 
those people’s moral obligation to the institutions of Azanian 
culture (e.g., in Manfou(i)r [Menefre]/Memphis, Aiwn [On] 
Beth-Shemesh or Heliopolis, Karnak/Luxor/Thebes, and or 
Meroe, etc.), it would have been inconceivable for genuine 
nationalists to associate themselves with such economically 
derived external political ideas which historically are respon-
sible for the demise of the Azanian culture.
Even if one would contest the Azanian nationalists proc-
lamation that the foundation stone of Nŋhana was laid by 
descendants of the Bantu-Ethiopian Pharaohs, who, in that 
critical period of their nation’s social history, were busily 
relocating that nation’s invaluable culture heritage to a secure 
location, the convincing parallels drawn in Azanism between 
the Moabas Sun-God Hyen-Nu (One Hand) and the dynastic 
Ethiopian (and later Egyptian) Heru/Horus (or Amon and 
Aton15), and the similarities also shown in that work between 
the kingship title of the Moab[a]s, Bét (messenger, announcer, 
teller, etc.) and Bes-Ptah of the early Pharaonic culture unde-
niably tilts in favor of culture contiguity. In fact, according to 
the mythological stipulation of the Moabas origin, especially 
the group which identifies itself as “Luok-Niib” (inhabitants 
of the Underworld16), their early male ancestor (Nyaan), like 
Bes-Ptah (and his seven deified-assistants), who founded the 
first earthly Order (after the perfect/prehuman World Order 
founded by Hyen-Nu), had four wives—each representing 
probably the geographical axis of mainland Azania or the 
quadrant angles the matriarchal foundation of the Pyramids—
who bore him seven sons. These became the seven extant 
ethnic extensions of that Bantu-Ethiopian subculture group, 
which could not only be rightly paralleled with the assistants 
of Bes-Ptah, but also made up the 12 astronomical figures 
represented in the so-called ancient Egyptian Calendar. Also, 
in his Signs and Symbols of Primordial Man: The Evolution 
of Religious Doctrines from the Eschatology of Ancient 
Egyptians, Albert Churchward (1994), who researched the 
traditional customs of the local population, observed that that 
symbolic culture figure “Seven” is in widespread use across 
the whole of Azania. Thus, if anything, it is culturally impel-
ling that the elderly of the Moabas are morally constrained 
from eating the flesh of the predynastic Crocodile deity 
Subk/Sebek. And the same is true of the culture custodians of 
the Bawulés (in Ivory Coast), who until today refrain from 
eating the flesh of rams—the culture symbol of Amon. By 
similar analytical token, a critical review of that mysterious 
culture animus, Bamaka-Koo (Crocodile of water), from 
whence Bamako (Mali’s capital) is derived, would confirm 
that Bamaka-Koo has indeed conceptual affinity with the 
Sebek deity of the dynastic period. And the same could be 
argued of the mysterious eternal giant black Serpent of the 
Dogon Pantheon.
Not surprisingly, the wealth and demise of ancient Ghana 
unavoidably found mythological elaboration in a ritualistic 
practice in honor of a giant black Serpent, Bida. However, 
unlike the giant black serpent which, in a genuine culture 
context, symbolizes the eternal Spirit of the Bantu-Ethiopians 
common ancestry (placed on an Island at the sources of the 
White Nile in Azanism), Bida had—by the time of Nŋhana’s 
demise—inherited the cannibalistic psychology associated 
with the political cultures of the incoming barbarians (from 
the north and northeastern fringes bordering the Azanian 
nation), who, as noted earlier, were largely responsible for 
the incremental destruction of the institutions of the Azanian 
culture.17 Thus, whether or not such interrelated and sym-
bolic culture practices and/or norms, especially the moral 
refrain from cannibalism, reflect the true objective of the 
Azanian culture,18 it can be stressed without erring that the 
Moabas played a central role in the foundation of Nghana. In 
fact, in Azanism, I derived the concept of Nghana (am I 
good?) from Moar/Molé—the language of the Moabas. This 
culturally pivotal Bantu-Ethiopian group is referred to in 
William’s (1989) work as Patan-Grumah (a federation of the 
former Mossi Kingdom). He described them as a sedentary 
folk, who (in Azanism) are still found in present day Chad, 
Guinea, modern Nŋhana (Ghana?), Mali, Niger, Sudan, 
To[n]go, and probably beyond. Accordingly, despite the fact 
that the social psychology of those who still associate them-
selves with the concept of colonial Africa is being influenced 
by external political ideas, the Azanians could forestall the 
pan-Africanists political preference of pseudoethnic entities 
(e.g., Biafra, Hutustans, Eritrea, etc. in Africa) by adversely 
opting for the total liberation of Azania (and with it the rein-
stitutionalization of her culture institutions).
Alas, Kwame Nkrumah was not alone in his readiness to 
relinquish northern Azania to Arabs colonial occupation. In a 
privately circulated article titled, “Nyerere’s Last Advice to 
Black Africa—Retreat From Continentalist to Sub-Saharan 
pan-Africanism,” Chinweizu (1987), the author of 
Decolonizing the African Mind, hinted to the fact that the late 
Julius Nyerere, who in 1963 considered colonial Africa to be 
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single geopolitical unit (with its present inhabitants repre-
senting one geopolitical constituency), was apt to declare in 
1997 that Africa South of the Sahara should henceforth be 
considered a distinct political unit which is quite separate in 
its identity and destiny from the Arabs-occupied part of 
Africa (see Godfrey, n.d.). While Chinweizu is doubtlessly 
vocal about the resurgence of Arab colonialism in Africa 
since the 1960s—after the “First Phase” was interrupted by 
the political development of the Ottoman Empire—and later 
West Europeans colonial inroads into Africa between the 17 
and 20th centuries, and tends to share Nyerere’s proposition 
to unify the indigenous population of colonial Africa South 
of the Nubian (Sahara?) desert, it seems rather unclear 
whether such a political union would imply relinquishing the 
“Sacred Land” of the Bantu-Ethiopians national culture to 
Arab colonialism. This notwithstanding, Chinweizu’s lament 
about the erosion of traditional culture norms amid the con-
tinuing colonial pressures and his urge on the need for the 
indigenous people of colonial Africa to resuscitate the cul-
ture institutions of their forebears as guidance for the 
future—in many of his privately circulated writings—merits 
nationalists attention.
Also, despite most pan-Africanists capitulation to the 
pending Arab colonialism, there is no doubt that Kwame 
Nkrumah’s invocation of such culture terms as Nŋhana 
(1957) and Azania (1958) for the former Gold Coast and 
South Africa, respectively, and/or Nyerere’s perception of a 
people’s identity and destiny would resonate ethno-culturally 
among revivalist intellectuals. Furthermore, Professor Ali A. 
Mazrui’s distinction between “Africans of the Blood and 
Africans of the Soil” is contemporaneous with national 
reproduction ideas in that he rightly includes the Azanians 
(Africans?) of the Diaspora (i.e., the Azanian Americans) in 
his list of the indigenous Azanians (or his Africans of the 
Blood and Soil). Notably, he defined this original group in 
racial and genealogical terms; and hence identifies them with 
the Blackness of Cham/Kemit. However, most Algerians, 
Libyans, Egyptians, Tunisians, and Moroccans are those of 
the soil and not necessarily of Blood (see Mazrui, 2009).
In genuine national context, revivalists could reasonably 
argue that in addition to the irreducibility of the Nile Valley 
region to the culture custodians of the Azanian nation 
(because of the process of the “Ritual of Resurrection”), the 
fact that among the citizens of Arabs-occupied part of colo-
nial Africa there are indigenous Azanians (e.g., the Nubians, 
the assimilated or aboriginal Arabs such as the black Arabs in 
Sudan or the so-called Semitic Ethiopians or Somalians) is 
bound to have serious ethno-culture and national implica-
tions for those Pan-Africanists who (in their blind service of 
the colonial ideal [Africa’s 53 states]) would rather forego 
the sacred land of the Azanians to Arab colonialism. Despite 
their subordinate economic and political status under the 
pending Arab colonial occupation, these marginalized and 
neglected indigenous Azanians must be encouraged to resist 
the colonial pillage of their ancestral (Cham’s) land.
Are We at the Verge of a Genuine 
Ethno-Cultural National Reawakening?
Even provided we eschew Gaddafi’s plaudit of pseudoethnic 
entities in Africa because of the political reality in Libya 
today, the fact that key members of the AU overtly condoned 
the NATO Air Strikes which led to overthrow of the Gaddafi’s 
regime (and his consequent assassination) shows how futile 
the AU really is. Already, Gaddafi’s early emphatic approval 
of the creation of pseudoethnic entities in Nigeria amounts to 
declaring the whole pan-African project moribund. So, even 
if the pan-Africanists would forgive the late Gaddafi for his 
direct role in the destabilization of other African states (e.g., 
Chad, Mali, Niger, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda, 
etc.) in the recent past, the universal indifference of Arab 
leaders to the systematic genocide and ethnic cleansing in 
Sudan (e.g., in Dafur, South Kordofan, the Nuba Mountains, 
etc.), and/or their silence on the deportation of hundreds of 
thousands of indigenous Azanians from Mauritania in the 
late 1970s and 1080s indicate that Arab leaders have an 
entirely different agenda for participating in the political pro-
cess of the AU. For instance, I noted in Azanism that revival-
ist intellectuals do not necessarily have to invoke the decline 
of the culture institutions of Uruk (Sumer/Sumeria), which at 
the onset was founded and controlled by Anu (and his daugh-
ter Ishtar/Isis),19 and/or the directly related historic occupa-
tion of the Delta region by the Hyksos, to grasp the 
geographical reach of their nation’s culture institutions. In 
fact, Amélineau Abbé Emile (1916), who had mistaken the 
Anu for an ethnic group, is also quoted in Diop’s (1974) 
African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality (see Guevara, 
2009/2011) as stating that the Anu people were the original 
inhabitants of Egypt and Arabia Patraea. So, the fact that 
some of these occupied territories are now considered indig-
enous to Arab colonialists suffices as a warning to revivalist 
intellectuals who still see the Great Nile Valley region as an 
irreducible part of their nation’s culture practices.
In essence, this analytical discernment which, as men-
tioned earlier, is meant to reintegrate the subcultures of the 
indigenous Azanians into the main culture school in Karnak/
Luxor does not necessarily imply that Karnak is the birth 
place of the Bantu/Cushitic-Ethiopians national culture. 
Thus, in referring to the celestial orientation of the Bantu-
Ethiopians national culture, I argued in Azanism that the 
placement of the green Nile goddess Hapi on the Mountain 
of the Moon (mountain Kilimanjaro), the Highest peak in 
Azania, prior to the construction of the miniature Pyramids 
in Meroe and then later the Great Pyramids of Giza—built 
during the period of the Solar Mythos (as by then the culture 
custodians of the Azanian nation would have probably 
established the precise location from which they could com-
municate proficiently with the celestial bodies)—suggests 
that the origin of that particular national culture lies further 
South, as in this Neferti’s optimism about the eventual res-
toration of the Maat:
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A king will come from the South;
Ameni, the justified, is his name,
The son of a woman of Nubia,
and a child of Upper Egypt,
He shall receive the white crown and wear the red crown. 
(Neferti, 57-59, quoted in Karenga, 2006, pp. 73-74ff)
This perception is further strengthened by the fact that the 
popular “Ritual [of Ausar/Osiris] Resurrection,” which at its 
peak, began with the introduction of the Sektit/Seher (also 
called Hennu’s) Boat through the tale of the Great Nile in the 
Delta region ended at the source of the great Nile River in the 
Congo-belt, where the eternal Spirit of the Bantu-Ethiopians 
ancestors (in the form of a giant black Serpent) was origi-
nally located. Eventually, whether or not one equates the 
symbolic culture act of having to travel upstream against the 
waves of the great Nile River with the idea of traveling 
through the culture symbol of the eternal Spirit of the 
Azaninans’ common ancestry, it remains to be said that (from 
the perspective of the Azanian national culture) the quest for 
eternity was never meant to be entrusted to the profane or the 
vulgar demoi. Hence, neither the wheel of the Hennu’s Boat 
nor the presentation of the Maat was confided to the profane/
demoi. In other words, that all Azanians are in line with the 
moral objective of their nation’s culture entitled to the right 
kind of knowledge about eternal life does not necessarily 
reduce the gerontocratic constitution of the Bantu/Cushitic-
Ethiopians pharaonic culture. In this sense, the embracement 
of the market-led liberal democratic institutions by both the 
founding fathers and current leaders of PAMs and/or the AU 
not only shows how disingenuous these really are on the sub-
ject of the emancipation of the Azanians but also how irrec-
oncilable their political objectives are in juxtaposition to that 
of the Azanian culture.
The eternal essence of that nation’s culture practice has 
found its convincing elaboration in Doctrina Azanica 
(Azanism). This position is also shared in Maulana Karenga’s 
Maatian ethics. For instance, drawing on King Kheti’s justifi-
cation for the practice of Maat, Karenga (2006) observed that 
“the stress on justification is not simply in the sense of being 
just but also in a sense of living Maat that would justify 
immortality” (p. 60). Maat is described as “nourishment for 
Ra (the perfect embodiment of life); Ra lives by it, it is offered 
to him and it is also his daughter” (Karenga, 2006, p. 64). 
Maat is also a nourishment for all the divinities as well as 
humans who strive for eternity, as stressed in Coffin Text 
(CT) IV, 62, 170. Accordingly, the Maatian ethics which orig-
inated from the cultural history of the Old Kingdom was, first,
established as a moral order with divine, natural and social 
dimensions. Secondly, Maat is counter-posed with isfet (evil, 
chaos, wrong-doing) as well as with . . . grg (falsehood) and 
wrong-doing. Thirdly, Maat is a standard and measure of both 
moral life on the personal and social level. Fourthly, Maat is tied 
to the concept of moral and social excellence . . . and the resultant 
worthiness. Finally, the ground of Maat is that it’s God’s will, 
and thus the King’s will and that it is good, effective and life-
giving. (Karenga, 2006, pp. 54-55)
Economic Agents’ Political Role in the Demise of 
the Azanian Culture
If from the onset of their nation’s social history, the Azanians 
had the moral obligation to endure such an indispensable cul-
ture journey that is likened to the traversing of the inner part 
of a black Serpent (as in the Ritual of Resurrection), one 
could reasonably foresee why the alliance of external and 
internal political agents—inspired by myopic economic 
objectives—have until today proven so detrimental to that 
nation’s culture institutions. Notably, “the divine inspiration 
to cultivate a perfect humanity capable of inhabiting both the 
terrestrial and celestial provinces”20 (as illustrated in the 
celestial orientation of the Azanian culture earlier) is doubt-
lessly irreconcilable with the sanguinary trait of the econom-
ically inspired state system, whose expansive policies are 
today responsible for the destruction of preestablished 
culture(s). In terms of the demise of the institutions of the 
Azanian national culture, historic records attest that the sys-
tematic/incremental infiltration (and usurpation) of that 
nation’s culture institutions by state agents goes as far back 
as the antiquity. Early record of such economically inspired 
political incursions is associated with the southward expan-
sion of the Greco-Europeans, who are generally known to 
have introduced the patriarchal system (capitalist patriarchy) 
in Azania. Importantly, one should read early Greco-
European migrations and settlements in three waves; and, 
above all, in light of the culture deficit (and/or failures) of the 
expansive state system. Ostensibly,
the first is associated with the Ionian and Dorian migrations of 
the last century of the 2nd Millennium BCE, which resulted in 
the settlements of City-States in Western Anatolia and was 
probably associated with the “Sea Peoples” (Hyksos) who later 
appeared in Egypt and Canaan (as the Philistines). The second 
and third waves, which occurred around 800 and 600 BCE, were 
highly organized land rush … where City-States sought to 
expand their influence and relieve over-population. (Guevara, 
2012)21
Notably, the remark about the perpetual trend of the native 
populations—and state agents rational historic response to 
such a natural phenomenon through state expansionism—is 
inevitably culturally imperative. That in turn impels this 
ancient testimony about the economic mind approach to 
native lands—the invaluable/irreducible culture assets of all 
nations: “Joseph bought all the land of the Egyptians, except 
only the land of the priests” (Genesis 47.22; Guevara, 2012, 
pp. 11-12; Kalopoulos, 2003, p. 249), which was ceded to 
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them by Ausar (Osiris; the god King) to cover the cost of 
their rituals (Diodorus Siculus, 1.21.7; Guevara, 2012, pp. 
11-12; Kalopoulos, 2003, p. 249). To get to that point, where 
the indigenous population of the then occupied Egypt (north-
ern part of Azania) were politically coerced into selling their 
land (the source of earthly life) in exchange for a grain of 
corn from that early external capitalist agent (Joseph), the 
bible tells us that there was this terrific famine of all times in 
that part of Azania. Although the bible has until now remained 
silent on the question whether that could possibly have been 
a man-made famine intended to force the local population off 
their ancestral land, it can rightly be argued that such polit-
ico-economic developments explain why the culture custodi-
ans of the Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom have historically been 
at the forefront of national emancipation and revival move-
ment. Notwithstanding, it is worth adding that by the turn of 
the 7th century b.c. the culture center of the Azanian nation 
(Karnak/Thebes) was largely under the political influence of 
the alliance of external and internal economic forces. This 
then explains the relocation of that nation’s culture institu-
tions to other parts of Azania, including Meroe whose demise 
herald the rise of Nŋhana (ancient Ghana). And as we will 
soon see, because the founders of Nŋhana not only inherited 
the culture institutions of their forebears, but also, lamenta-
bly, the political intrigue that earlier cemented the disintegra-
tion of the Azanian nation, it was only a matter of time before 
they too became victims of similar intrigue.
Indeed, economically, early Greek, Roman, and Christian 
writers had extolled the fruits of the Bantu-Ethiopians 
national culture, as in Homer’s Iliad:
Royal Thebes
Egyptian treasure house of countless wealth,
Who boast her hundred gates through each of which,
With horses and two hundred warriors march. (see Homer’s 
Iliad, 9, 381ff; Guevara, 2009/2011, pp. 219-220)
Regarding the economic autarky of the ancient Ethiopian 
Kingdom, Strabo described ancient Egypt as “from the begin-
ning the most self-sufficient land on the earth” (Kalopoulos, 
2003, p. 252 cited in Guevara, 2009/2011, p. 220). A point 
also reiterated in early biblical scripts “was watered as 
Gardens of the Lord, as the land of Egypt” (Genesis 13.10; 
Guevara, 2009/2011, pp. 219-220; Kalopoulos, 2003, p. 252).
By similar analytical token, it could be stressed without 
erring that, in its over thousand years history, the kingdom of 
Nŋhana boasted similar
economic achievements with extensive economic relations 
stretching as far as Portugal, Spain, and probably beyond. In the 
culture front, credible evidence attests that late Egyptian, 
European, and Asian students had erstwhile studied Philosophy, 
Law, Mathematics, and Medicine in the tertiary institutions/
Universities of ancient Ghana. (Hannah, 1967, p. 201)
Subsequently, the mythological stipulation about the 
wealth and decline of ancient Ghana through the giant black 
serpent (Bida), whose psychological existence depended on 
the blood of virgin lives (Auset/Isis’s life?), not only amounts 
to a total aberration from the ethical norms of the Azanian 
culture, but, above all, also reveals an unbearable state of 
moral decadence, at least on the part of that kingdom’s elites, 
by the time of Nŋhana’s demise. In contrast to the life-serving 
purpose of the Azanian national culture, we are told that the 
sanguinary Bida demanded an annual sacrifice of beautiful 
virgins in return for guaranteeing the prosperity of ancient 
Ghana. The year in which the fiancé (Mamadu Sarolle) res-
cued the intended victim unleashed Bida’s wrath in the form 
of a drought that covered the whole kingdom. Consequently, 
gold mining, among others, fell into decline and with it the 
disintegration of ancient Ghana.22
Apart from the analogy of Bida’s mythology with the 
human-sacrificing rituals known of the Artemis cult (and/or 
other foreign deities like Allāt and Ashirath, etc.), whose fol-
lowers were to later incrementally infiltrate and usurp the 
institutions of the Bantu/Cushitic-Ethiopians national cul-
ture, the fact that the then Islamized Mamadu Sarolle was the 
fiancé of Bida’s last victim, whose rescue unleashed that ser-
pent’s scorching wrath culminating in the demise of Nŋhana, 
suggests that by the time of Nŋhana’s disintegration external 
political influence had indeed permeated the psychology of 
some local leaders (and with them the large sections of the 
local population as well). Critics could, for example, contrast 
Bida’s deviant sanguinary reach with the biblical testimony 
that Abraham refrained from sacrificing his son Isaac after 
his encounter with the culture symbol of Amon, the ram.
Furthermore, Maulana Karenga, who has critically 
explored the traditional emphasis of the Maatian ethnics, 
draws our attention to the centrality of traditional norms 
through the valuable teachings of Merikare:
Emulate your fore-parents, your ancestors.
Lo, their words endure in books.
Open and read them and emulate their knowledge.
For one who is taught becomes skilled. (Karenga, 2006, pp. 
60-61; Merikare, pp. 35-3623)
Hence, the Maatian ethics, which was originally meant to 
instruct the wise, “comes to her/him in its pure essence like 
the condition of the sayings of the ancestors” (Karenga, 
2006, p. 60).
As Karenga further observes, the Book of Khunanup, 
commonly called “The Story of the Eloquent Peasant,” 
which he described as a text on social justice and moral 
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narrative, not only urges leaders to live Maat (truth, justice, 
righteousness) but also reminds them that long life and 
immortality are based on Maatian conduct. Thus, “doing 
Maat (justice), so Khunanup (the Peasant), is like a breath to 
the nose” (Karenga, 2006, p. 70). Moreover, the rejection of 
isfet (evil) through the Maatian conduct is not only in line 
with tradition, but is importantly a yearning for the eternal 
qualities of Ra, the authentic source of Maat and light-giver. 
Thus, in CT II, 149, the deceased says, “I shine like Ra daily, 
I establish Maat and expel falsehood.”
I am (one) who obeys no magic, who is not scorched by fire nor 
wet by water.
I will be like Ra every day
One who will be fashioned everyday by the
Sun-folk who saw yesterday. (CT II, 54; Karenga, 2006, p. 64)
Despite having derived such fervent nostalgic longing for 
tradition from the First Intermediate and Middle Kingdoms, 
the literary texts from these periods diverge considerably 
from that of the Old Kingdom. Texts dated from this period 
show evidence of provincial rulers increasing independence 
and years of famine which created huge problems (Karenga, 
2006; Vandier, 1936) across the kingdom. As Assmann 
rightly observed,
a fundamental characteristic of Maatian discourse in the Old 
Kingdom is that there appears to be, at least formally, an implicit 
“Selsbtverständlichkeit” attached to Maat. [Hence,] it was not 
put in question and therefore not thematized. Everyone knew 
what Maat was. There arose no communicative need to come to 
an understanding concerning it. (Assmann, 1990, p. 55; Karenga, 
2006, pp. 55-56)
But with the breakdown of social order from this period, 
“L’évidence naturelle de la Maat, incoprporée dans le roi 
s’est decompose. La Maat, devenue problématique, deviant 
thématisable” [The natural evidence of MAAT embodied in 
the King was decomposed. MAAT having become problem-
atic, became thematizable] (Assmann, 1989, p. 34). Not sur-
prisingly, “Offering Maat to God which earlier is posed as 
social practice later emerges as a central ritual as depicted in 
the iconography of the New Kingdom and Late periods” 
(Karenga, 2006, pp. 55-58; Teeter, 1990, 1997).
Ostensibly, I have explored in considerable detail (in 
Azanism) the role external and internal political forces played 
in undermining the institutions of the Bantu-Ethiopians phar-
aonic culture, especially during the reign of Amenophis III 
and IV. For our present purpose, let’s then assume that 
Akhenaten/Echnaton’s radical aberration from traditional 
culture norms (as validated by the sand mounds of al Amarna 
in Arabs-occupied Egypt) was the historic precedent of 
Bida’s transformation from being originally the symbolic 
representation of the eternal Spirit of the Bantu-Ethiopians 
common ancestry into a monstrous political deity, whose 
psychological existence depended on the blood of virgin 
Auset(s). Without such external political interventions the 
pseudocultural developments that was to later cement the 
demise of the institutions of the Azanian culture would have 
been unthinkable—not in Manfouir/Menefre (Greeks 
Memphis), Iwnu/ Ā[w]anu (Greeks Heliopolis, Jewish Beth-
Shemesh or the biblical On), Karnak/Thebes, Napata, Meroe, 
or later Kimbé Salah/Saleh (the capital of Nŋhana).
As for the demise of Nŋhana, Arabo-Islamic tradition also 
attests to the fact that Almoravid Muslims from the North 
succeeded in infiltrating the kingdom incrementally and 
eventually invaded it. Initially, the Islamic community at 
Kimbé Saleh remained a separate community some distance 
away from the king’s palace. It even had its own mosques 
and schools, while the king retained his traditional beliefs. In 
the kingdom’s closing days, however, traditional kings had 
to rely on Muslim scholars to run the administration of the 
territory. With Takrur to the west already transformed into an 
Islamic community, which then evolved ever closer trading 
ties with the Arabs-occupied part of colonial Africa, it was 
only a matter of time before Kimbé Saleh, whose local lan-
guages in some parts of the city were already deemed sacri-
lege for Islamic practices, would succumb to the same 
political pressures that earlier cemented the demise of the 
Azanian nation.
With the demise of Nŋhana in the 13th century a.d.,24 it 
was only ineluctable that such weak unviable tribal entities 
as the Ashanti-, Mali-, Mossi-, Shongai- and the Oyo empires, 
and/or, tragically, the Hausas’s city-states became the univer-
sally approved political norm in the entire region. As we are 
by now aware, these have since been replaced by the postco-
lonial African states, which lamentably also owe their origin 
to the Westphalian heritage. At this analytical juncture, genu-
ine nationalist/revivalist intellectuals are simply reminded 
that the relative ease with which Ivory Coast, Libya, and 
Mali recently succumbed to the prevailing colonial yoke 
suggests that maintaining the African states amounts to noth-
ing less than an ethnocide.
Ethnic and Culture Reintegration as Nationalist 
Rejection of the Colonial Heritage
If indeed the enfeebled Hausas’s city-states, which in the 
18th century fell so miserably to Osman Dan Fodio’s Arabo-
Islamist forces (not to mention the fact that both Mali and 
Nigeria, in short the AU, are presently heavily reliant on 
their former European colonial masters in their fight against 
the resurgent Arabo-Islamic colonialism), are the future 
political ideal pan-African intellectuals and leaders would 
envisage for Africa’s pseudoethnic (tribal) entities, they 
should be reminded that—in genuine national context—the 
Hausas, like other subculture groups of Nŋhana, attest to 
sharing the same ancestral lineage with the rest of the Bantu/
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Cushitic-Ethiopians. In fact, Dan Masanin—a Hausa histo-
rian, Maitama Sule, who is also a leading figure in the Kano 
Emirate, not only believes in an authentic ethnic connection 
spanning the whole of the indigenous inhabitants of Azania 
but also argues credibly that the Hausas are ethno-culturally 
linked to the rest of the Cushitic-Ethiopians. He even goes 
further to cite linguistic similarities as well as the fact that 
these subculture groups shared the worship of the Sun-god 
prior to the introduction of Christianity and Islam in colo-
nial Africa. If anything, most informed Hausas not only 
believe to be the original inhabitants of the Nubian 
(Saharan?) Desert region but are also convinced that some 
of their leaders are descendants of the indigenous Pharaohs. 
Even today, the palace of Daura contains a sword which 
some Hausas believe came from the pharaohs.25
Furthermore, in the mythological stipulation about the 
origin of the Hausas, we also learn about the “Hausa Bakwai” 
(seven Hausas), Kano, Zazzau (Zaria), Gobir, Katsina, Rano, 
Daura, and Biram, and the “Banza Bakwai” (Zamfara, 
Kebbik, Nupe, Gwari, Yauri, Yoruba, and Kororofa). This 
other seven Hausas are considered to be the descendants of 
an extramarital affair between the Hausas’s male ancestor 
Bawa and a concubine. The significance of this latter narra-
tive is not only the inclusion of Yoruba among the common 
lineage of the Hausas but also the fact that it contains a fan-
tastic twist that purports a genealogical link between the 
Hausas and the Arabs. And as we shall see, this latter legend-
ary narrative merely reveals the creative genius of later 
Islamized Hausa scholars, who might have desperately tried 
to reconcile local myths with incoming Arabo-Islamic influ-
ences. Thus, just as early Arabic and Islamic scholars estab-
lished a spurious ancestral link with the biblical Abraham 
and his Cushitic-Ethiopian (Egyptian?) wife, so too did polit-
ical-expedient Hausas, whose legitimacy as leaders was by 
now not based on their elevated knowledge of the local cul-
ture but instead dependent on their genealogical link to the 
founder (prophet) of Islam, see the need to reinvent their 
ancestral history in line with the Arabo-Islamic leadership 
model. In any event, Islamized Hausas and Fulanis are not 
idiosyncratic in making such spurious claims. It is an estab-
lished norm in colonial Africa that most local leaders subser-
vient to Arabo-Islamic political influence are one way or the 
other genealogical linked to Prophet Mohammed. Thus, 
when I left Luanda ([A]Ngola, South West Azania,) in the 
early 1990s, Islam was virtually nonexistent. It was recently 
introduced into that part of Azania by local converts from the 
Great Lakes region and/or West and North Azania. But that 
should not preclude the possibility that there might already 
be some politically conscious converts who conceive the 
need to establish such a genealogical lineage. One must not 
forget that the legitimacy and future of Morocco’s (heredi-
tary) Monarchy hinges on similar spurious assumptions.
If anything, this critical review of the mythology of Bida 
and that of the Hausas’s origin suffice to validate the forego-
ing arguments. In the myth of the Hausas origin, we are told 
that the son of Bagdad king (Bayajidda or Abuyazidu) had a 
quarrel with his father, and, consequently, left Bagdad only 
to find himself in Daura (one of the seven city-states of the 
Hausas, north of Kano). While in Daura, Bayajidda (out-
sider) found out that the local inhabitants were being terror-
ized and deprived of drinking water by a giant serpent, which 
took over the well of the local community. As gratitude for 
Bayajidda’s brave act in killing that giant serpent, the king of 
Daura gave him his daughter to marry. Their first son Bawa 
(servant) went forth to give birth to the Hausa–Bakwai 
(founders of the seven city-states of the Hausas).26
Putting aside the question why the entire population of 
Daura would in those days have depended on a single well 
for its source of drinking water, critics are reminded that the 
time Osman Dan Fodio’s Arabo-Islamic forces captured the 
city-states of the Hausas Bagdad (Iraq) was among the most 
important centers of Islamic scholarship. Moreover, with the 
inclusion of the “Hausa Bakwai” and “Banza Bakwai” in this 
legend, one could reasonably perceive a rational incorpora-
tion of incoming Arabo-Islamic patriarchal influences in the 
myth of Hausas’s origin. Thus, just as Sarah—Abraham’s 
first and legitimate wife—begot Isaac (the male ancestor of 
the Hebrews), and his illegitimate Nuba–Egyptian wife, 
Hagar, begot Ismael (the presumed male ancestor of the 
Arabs), so too had the Hausas’s male ancestors both legiti-
mate and illegitimate sons. Bayajidda’s killing of the giant 
black serpent (the primordial embodiment of the eternal 
spirit of the Bantu-Ethiopians ancestry) tends to add even 
more to that romanticized legend in that it not only incorpo-
rates elements of the mythology of Bida but also implicitly 
invokes the wholly politicized biblical narration depicting 
Abraham’s sacrificial killing of the culture symbol of Amon 
(ram) in the place of his son Isaac—during the occupation of 
Lower Egypt by the Hyksos. In viewing this, are we not deal-
ing here with a systematic external political attempt to extir-
pate the culture/mythical symbols of the Bantu-Ethiopians 
national culture?
In contrast, I observed in Azanism that the blood that cir-
culates the veins of the culture symbols of the Bantu-
Ethiopians Kingdom (e.g., the Ram or the Apis Bull of 
Manfouir/Menefre) is dependent entirely on the vegetation 
(remedy) of Ausar/Osiris resurrection. Moreover, that Anubis 
and the Subk/Sebek deity, the predynastic crocodile deity of 
the Moabas (Moabites of pre-Israelite Canaan?) or later the 
culture symbol of the capital of the present day Mali 
(Bamaka-ko [Crocodile of water]), were also included 
among the Judges of the Dead during the dynastic Pharaonic 
period begs the conclusion that the custodians of the Azanian 
culture had erstwhile succeeded in acculturating these latter 
cannibalistic animals in accord with the life-serving purpose 
of genuine culture(s). In the case of Anubis, after it had lost a 
survival (intellectual) contest against the Rabbit.27 With this 
analytical discernment, revivalist intellectuals would simply 
like to remind the pan-Africanist (and other pseudonational-
ist) intellectuals that we share the genuine 
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nationalists position that the Bantu-Ethiopians are ethnically 
and culturally akin, and that the prevailing (divisive) colonial 
model influencing the psychology of the subjects of colonial 
Africa is not a realistic substitute for genuine identity forma-
tion process. To strengthen this position, let’s expound on the 
history of the Dagbon (also known as the Dagbon-Molé) of 
modern Nŋhana (Ghana?), as this adds more to the ongoing 
analytical discernment in support of an ethno-culture national 
identity for the Azanians.
In the mythology of the origin of the Dagbon-Molé one is 
told that their male ancestor, Tohadzie—the red hunter—
descended from Zamfara (one of the “Banza Bakwai” of the 
Hausas). The young Tohadzie, who, like his grandfather 
Bayajidda, was doubtlessly driven by sociopolitical ambi-
tions, left Zamfara only to find himself in a town of the then 
nascent Mali Empire. It would seem Tohadzie arrived in 
Mali shortly after the disintegration of the kingdom of 
Nŋhana. For, unlike Bayajidda, who earlier rescued the 
indigenous inhabitants of Daura from the terror of a giant 
black serpent which took control of the locals’ only source of 
drinking water, the brave Tohadzie had to grapple this time 
with a black buffalo (the “Apis Bull” of Manfouir?), which 
astonishingly not only took control of that Malian commu-
nity’s only source of drinking water but also killed anyone 
who dared to fetch water from that town’s river. After leading 
the drought-stricken community to slain their bestial enemy, 
Tohadzie was also not only offered a Malian princess (called 
Pagawugba) for marriage but he also eventually inherited the 
throne of that local community. If anything, the newly wed-
ded royal couple eventually gave birth to a son (Kpognambo), 
who, in line with the hereditary norm of the incoming patri-
archal model, was also imbued with Tohadzie gallantry and 
hunting qualities.
Inasmuch as the killing of the eternal spirit of the Bantu-
Ethiopian ancestors by Bayajidda or the killing of the sacred 
Apis Bull of Manfouir by his grandson Tohadzie is con-
cerned, it could reasonably be argued that the “Green 
Crown,” which originally had served as the legitimate geron-
tocratic title of the Pharaonic system had (after the demise of 
Karnak) lost its culture significance, and the political events 
that unfolded since then right through to the current political 
crisis engulfing the whole ECOWAS region amounts to what 
one could readily qualify as genuine political sorcery.
Succinctly, after the death of Kpognambo’s parents, he 
traveled westwards from the then Malian Empire to Buin (in 
Fadan Grumah),28 where after defeating the Tendana, he 
usurped the kingdom’s throne and ruled it until his death.
In Buin, Kpognambo married two wives, Sihisabiga 
(daughter of Buin spiritual leader) and Suhuyini (the daugh-
ter of the king of Fadan Grumah). Suhuyini gave birth to 
Gbewaa29 and Sihisabiga gave birth to Malgimsi, Nyelgili, 
and Mamzisheli.
After Kpognambo’s death, and with replacement of the 
gerontocratic constitution of the Azanian culture with the 
incoming economically inspired patriarchal model, and with 
four sons of an early political marriage vying for the throne 
of Buin, it was only a matter of time before internal dissen-
sion fractured that kingdom. The ensuing conflicts forced 
Gbewaa and his followers to emigrate to Pusiga, the Upper 
Eastern region of modern Nŋhana (Ghana). Here, Naa 
Gbewaa and his followers established the kingdom of greater 
Dagbon, which he ruled until his death. Kpognambo’s other 
sons, Nyelgili founded the chieftainship of Nangodi and 
Namzisheli founded Tongo.
Following the death of Naa Gbewaa, similar succession 
wars ensued among his sons and grandsons. Such divisive 
conflicts reached their peak when Zirli murdered his brother 
Kufogu to inherit Biun’s throne—and this much to the dis-
agreement of his other siblings. With that act, the final stage 
was set for further conflicts leading to the eventual breakup 
of the Dagbon Kingdom into the modern Dagbon kingdoms 
(with their lion rulers; Staniland, 1975).
It was in the midst of such perdurable political crisis that 
other Naa Gbewaa’s sons, Sitobu, Tohagu, and Mantambo 
migrated further southwards from Pusiga and found the 
Manprusi Kingdom (Tohagu), the Nanun Kingdom 
(Mantambo), and Sitobu, the modern Dagbon Kingdom. 
Hence, the Nanun, Mamprugu, and Dagbon people consider 
each other as brothers. In addition, a daughter of Naa 
Gbewaa, Yentuagri, married a Patan Grumah and they found 
the Mossi Kingdom. The narrative even goes on to add the 
Kusasis and other groups of modern Ghana, To[n]go, and 
Burkina Faso among descendants of the Dagbon.30 That the 
Patan-Grumahs are today found in Mali, Niger, Guinea, 
Chad, Sudan, and parts of Southern Libya, and so on suffices 
to remind critics of the complexity involved in terms of iden-
tity formation process in Azania as a whole.
Important about this concise history of the Dagbon-Molé 
is the interrelated ethnic role the Hausas and Patan-Grumahs 
(the Moabas) have played in the emergence of the other sub-
culture groups (tribes?) of that region. Subsequently, in 
Azanism, I referred to the Bantu-Ethiopian subculture group 
called “Luok Niib” (inhabitants of the underworld) whose 
seven male ancestors shared the same ancestral lineage and 
who until today not only maintain the Subk/Sebek deity of 
the predynastic period but also continue to worship Hyen-Nu 
(Heru/Horus?).31 Furthermore, while the kingship titles of 
the other subculture groups of Nŋhana are Nam, Naan, Naba 
(also linked to Meroe), Nana, and so on, “Bét” (messenger), 
which I paralleled with “Bes-Ptah” in Azanism, is the authen-
tic kingship title of Moabas. It is even culturally significant 
that “Nab” in Moar/Molé means cow; and indigenous 
Pharaohs during the dynastic era were known to be referred 
to as “bulls, either of the sky or earth” (Christopher, 2002).
Therefore, the custodians of the Azanian national culture, 
who until this day consider the total liberation of the Nile 
Valley region as concomitant to the reintroduction of the 
“Ritual of Resurrection,” which, as noted elsewhere, is irre-
ducibly bound with that peoples’ culture quest for real free-
dom (as life in its eternal manifestation), will lament African 
 at Birkbeck Library on June 3, 2013sgo.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Guevara 11
leaders’ and pan-African intellectuals’ subscription to the 
colonial African ideal as a total aberration from the genuine 
national cause.
In fact, culturally speaking, apart from the promise of 
paradise after the violent death of the profane in her or his 
myrmidon service to the state system, leaders of the world’s 
dominant political religions, which continue to influence the 
psychology of the subjects of colonial Africa, are far from 
convincing genuine nationalists with their economic response 
to the imminent culture challenge humanity faces, namely, 
the perpetual growth of native populations. However, in con-
trast to the murderous reach of these political sorcerers (as in 
the human-sacrificing rituals remarked elsewhere of foreign 
political deities, which in contemporary context is merely 
transmogrified into the incessant rivalries of the expansive 
states), the custodians of the Azanian national culture were—
from the onset of their nation’s social history—not only pre-
scient of that imminent culture challenge but even anticipated 
that through the appropriate culture measures humanity is 
intellectually capable of attaining real freedom. Accordingly, 
the well-known “Ritual of Resurrection” in the “Book of 
Coming Forth by Day” and the closely related culture pro-
cess of the “Mummification of the deceased indigenous 
Pharaohs” should be seen as supplementary to the underly-
ing objective of the Azanian culture—that is eternity first and 
then resurrection.
To transpose the afflatus of the Azanian culture radically, 
the custodians of the culture institutions of the Bantu/
Cushitic-Ethiopians Pharaonic system are unanimous in their 
conviction about the homogeneity of local/national culture(s). 
Nevertheless, they also tend to maintain that in each earthly 
nation’s culture quest for a superior (immortal) identity, lead-
ers of the various earthly nations would ineluctably arrive at 
an epistemological junction (in the form of an Ankh), where 
they would be summoned by the conscience of Universal 
Existence to present their distinctive culture documents (e.g., 
the Maat) as testaments to each nation’s nonpareil service to 
Life. But, in light of the foregoing analysis, the panache of 
the Bantu-Ethiopians culture school is simply that such a 
conscious voluntary integration of the earthly nations culture 
documents (is this the Universal Constitution of Nations?) at 
the advent of a perfect humanity, which is capable of transit-
ing the terrestrial and celestial provinces must not be con-
fused with the democratic constitutions of existing Polities 
(which are mainly composed of economic adventurers/spec-
ulators, political sorcerers, mother murderers, homosexuals, 
pedophiles, etc.)—because the objective of the overarching 
Constitution is the service of Life in her eternal manifesta-
tion. In other words, the perception that pristine culture must 
be subservient to Life’s purpose unequivocally contradicts 
the prevailing multicultural casuistry at the base of the demo-
cratic constitution of the nation-state system, which, as 
observed elsewhere, is—even if somehow panurgic and for-
tuitous—fully embraced by both AU leaders and PAMs 
intellectuals.
Conclusion
Apodictically, this essaic-article took critical issue with the 
mainstream views espoused mainly by agents of colonialism, 
leaders and intellectuals of the PAMs and those of Africa’s 
tribal irredentism, that there is anything ethno-cultural (and 
hence national) about the so-called African tribes. Drawing 
largely from the social history of precolonial/prepolitical 
Africa, that is, the Bantu/Cushitic-Ethiopians kingdom 
(Azanian nation), I demonstrated lucidly and vividly that far 
from being distinct ethno-culture nationalities as is often 
portrayed in the mainstream scholarship, the African tribes 
are better considered subculture groups, whose providential 
and provincial culture norms and practices erstwhile paid 
tribute to the objective of the Azanian culture. For instance, 
using the culture symbols and practices of some local groups 
and linking them to that of predynastic and dynastic 
Pharaonic periods, I observed that there is compelling evi-
dence against qualifying the so-called African tribes as dis-
tinct ethno-culture national communities. In genuine culture 
context, the old age Ritual of Resurrection and the interre-
lated culture process of the mummification of a deceased 
indigenous Pharaohs attest that the moral objective of that 
nation’s culture is irreducibly subservient to Life’s purpose 
as exemplified by the immortality of Hyen-Nu (Heru/
Horus?). Furthermore, there are recurrent culturally sanc-
tioned ethical instances among the elderly of these subcul-
ture groups (e.g., the moral constraint from eating the flesh 
of any of the culture symbols assigned to their nation’s cul-
ture institutions such as the Subk/Sebek deity, the Apis Bull, 
the ram symbol of Amon, etc.), which genuinely pay tribute 
to the overarching culture norm. Moreover, the fact that at its 
apogee, the process of the Ritual of Resurrection began in the 
Delta region of the Nile Valley and ended at the Sources of 
the White Nile, where the spirit of the deceased indigenous 
Pharaohs was introduced into the pneumatic habitation of 
their ancestors, contradicts conventional wisdom that ancient 
Egypt (during the reign of the indigenous Pharaohs) was a 
distinct national community isolated from the rest of Azania. 
Therefore, the emphatic approval of the pending Arab colo-
nial occupation of the sacred land of the Bantu/Cushitic-
Ethiopians Kingdom-Azania and/or the approval of the 
emergence of pseudoethnic identities on Africa’s political 
plain by the AU leadership and PAMs intellectuals indicate 
how really disingenuous these are on the question of national 
emancipation and unity.
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Notes
 1. Diop (1974), who discussed the culture significance of the 
ancient Ethiopian Pan-deity Min in his African Origin of 
Civilization: Myth or Reality, also stressed that only the indig-
enous Ethiopians were permitted to worship that national 
deity. In Azanism, I derived the concept of “Min/Miné” (me) 
from Moar/Molé in that the Moaba(s) are the only subculture 
group of the Azanian nation which until today worship the 
ancient Bantu-Ethiopians (and later ancient Egyptians) Sun-
God Hyen-Nu (One Hand). A concept later misappropriated by 
the Greco-Europeans as Heru/Horus.
 2. Manfouir in Moar/Molé means Life. But it also means infi-
nite phenomenon, thereby making life an infinite phenom-
enon. Etymologically, it is a combination of two words, 
Maann (phenomenon) and Fou(i)r (infinite), which is derived 
from the verb fou(i)n (respiration). The belief in the infinite 
phenomenal respiratory organism such as Life is derived 
mythologically from the love between Geb and Hyen-Nu. 
The difficulty involved in that laborious and numinous task 
meant to demonstrate Hyen-Nu’s nonpareil love to earthly 
life is illustrated by the description of rain as the sweat from 
the pores of Hyen-Nu and Earth/Geb. N[y]un is the primor-
dial water which nourishes the rivers and oceans earthy life 
depends on. It is also the interaction between Hyen-Nu (in 
the form of Sun rays/Ani) and Geb that the crude air (vapor?) 
which earthly life breath is generated and purified by the veg-
etation/remedy of Ausar’s resurrection.
 3. For Gaddafi attacks on Christian scriptures visit http://barth-
snotes.wordpress.com/2008/03/20/gaddafi-attacks-christian-
scriptures-at-mosque-opening; for his visit to Kampala on the 
occasion of the Mosque opening, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/7305641.stm.
 4. http:/ /www.saharareporters.comnews/5572-nigeria- 
recalls-libya-ambassador/
 5. http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/55575
 6. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7864604.stm
 7. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7870431.stm
 8. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7870431.stm
 9. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7864604.stm
10. In discussing the indigenous Pharaonic model of leadership 
and linking it to the presentation of Maat at the advent of a 
King/Queen legitimate ascension to the Pharaonic throne, 
I gave priority to the authentic gerontocratic monarchy as 
opposed to hereditary monarchy, which was undoubtedly 
introduced in Azania by colonial agents.
11. On Karl Marx’s defends of British colonial policies in India, 
see John Gray (2007).
12. Having researched extensively in Ngola (Angola) during the 
war years, I have firsthand knowledge of the exact role inter-
nationalists forces played in the liberation struggle in colonial 
Africa. This notwithstanding, that the economic and political 
objectives of Scientific Socialism are in most cases contrary 
to the indigenous Azanians culture quest for real freedom has 
been simply overlooked by most African leaders and PAMs 
intellectuals (see Guevara, 2009/2011, pp. 156-158 further 
details).
13. The Doctrina Azanica (Guevara, 2009/2011) not only links 
the culture center of Sumer (Uruk), which at the onset was 
presided by Anu and his daughter Auset (Ishtar/Isis), to the 
Azanian culture center in Karnak, but also explores the politi-
cal intrigue surrounding the demise of that culture center’s 
security—the conservationist Enkidu (discussed in the Epics 
of Gilgamesh) in light of similar political marriages in the 
courts of Amenophis III and IV, which doubtlessly facilitated 
the infiltration and destruction of the culture institutions of the 
Bantu-Ethiopians Pharaonic system.
14. Nŋhana in Moar/Molé, the language of the Moabas (simply 
means am I good?) (also see Guevara, 2009/2011).
15. In Guevara (2009/2011, pp. 241-244), I noted that there is 
no credible academic justification to discriminate between 
Hyen-Nu, Amon, Aton, and/or A-Nu (Anu), as all refers to 
the same Sun-God in Moar/Molé. Amon (A = you [are])+Mon 
(red) is merely referring to the reddish radiance of the rising or 
descending Sun; while Aton (A+ton [hot]) is made in reference 
to the glowing radiance of the same Sun-God.
16. Luok, in essence, simply means an existential state of either 
dwelling in a deep pit or a cave, and Nu-rua, the singular of 
(Niib), means the creature of Hyen-Nu. The general idea of 
inhabiting a cave made in reference to this Bantu-Ethiopian 
group makes sense given the celestial orientation of the 
Azanian culture. In addition, a parallel could be drawn between 
that existential state and that of Bes-Ptah as the first anthropo-
morphized deity of the Azanian culture, who (together with his 
seven assistants) created the first earthly order in pursuit of the 
original/perfect world order attributed to Hyen-Nu.
17. For the cannibalistic tendencies associated with the politi-
cal cultures of the Nordic gods, see Guevara (2009/2011, 
pp. 113-114); on early Greek and Roman attestation of the 
rejection of Azanian culture of such sanguinary practices see 
Guevara (2009/2011, pp. 196-198).
18. A thorough study would also prove that committed elderly of 
the Bantu-Ethiopian subculture groups (e.g., the Ashantis, the 
Bamuns [Ba-Amun], Bawulés, Ba-Congos, Zulus, etc.) are 
until today morally constrained from eating the flesh of any 
one of the symbolic animalistic deities of the Azanian culture.
19. Unlike Amélineau Abbé Emile and Diop who tend to consider 
Anu/Ani as an ethnic group and the original builders of the 
ancient Ethiopian (Egyptian?) city of Aiwn (On), I observed 
in Azanism that there is no genuine academic justification 
to discriminate between A+Nu (Anu) and Hyen-Nu. In fact, 
there are different hieroglyphic symbols denoting Heru/
Horus (e.g., One Eye, Falcon, One Finger, One Hand, etc.). 
Accordingly, A (You/r) + Nu (Hand) merely refers to the origi-
nal Self-created-creating-Hand.
20. The trend of human population suggests that the custodians 
of the Azanian culture were indeed right in equating earthly 
beings with the stellar bodies. Thus, the infinite expansion 
of the stars means the human population has the natural pro-
pensity of attaining the 100 billion mark on Earth which thus 
impels the culture quest for perfect being.
21. On Greeks and Phoenician Colonies, see http://tjbuggey.
ancients.info/colonies.html; quoted in Guevara (2012).
22. See Bida Myth and ancient Ghana at http://destee.com/forums/
archive/index.php/t-42137.html
23. For further details about “The Teaching for Merikare,” see 
Faulkner, Wente, and Simpson (1973, pp. 180-197, esp. pp. 
181-182).
24. Mythology of Bida and ancient Ghana, http://destee.com/
forums/achive/index.php/t-42137.html
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25. On Hausas/Ethiopians ethnic link visit http://www.nairaland.
com/nigeria/topic-52994.0.html
26. Oral version of the Bayajidda legend: http://dierklange.com/pdf/
fulltexts/hausa/08_source-bayajidda-legend.pdf; and for Hausa 
history, http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/XVI/455.full.
pdf (esp. pp. 455-479).
27. An advanced oral version of the survival contest between the 
dog-headed god Anubis and the Rabbit is found among the 
elderly of the Moabas.
28. The Fadan Grumahs used here are the Patan-Grumahs of the 
Mossi Kingdom in Chancellor William’s The Destruction of 
Black Civilization.
29. Gbewaa, testicle, tends to emphasize the masculinity of that 
son.
30. Abridged History of the Dagbon at http://www.dagbon.net/
history.php.
31. For an extensive discussion about the importance of the figure 
seven to the culture of indigenous people of colonial Africa, 
see Albert Churchward (1994).
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